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This paper gives a systematic presentation of public opinion on the euro: the expected consequences, the 
advantages, and also the fears people have about introducing the single currency. The research also aims to 
identify the economic variables that may influence citizens’ attitudes towards the euro. The econometric 
analysis indicates that a higher level of development and higher earnings have a positive impact on public 
support for the euro, while the unemployment rate and corruption have a negative effect. People think that 
the euro will have a positive effect; the majority of citizens in the non-euro area are in favour of adopting the 
euro (but as late as possible); the majority were afraid of losing control over the national economic policy; 
people expect abuses and cheating on prices during the changeover, and increased inflation following the 
adoption of the euro. The two countries most opposed to the euro are Poland and the Czech Republic due 
to political issues. The two countries that have announced the start of the euro adoption process are Croatia 
and Bulgaria. 
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1. Introduction
The EU new member states1 adopted different po-
sitions in terms of the introduction of the euro, 
i.e. there are some countries which have already 
adopted the euro (Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Mal-
ta, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and some which 
have not (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Croatia). The requirement to 
adopt the euro is included in the Accession Treaty 
that the EU signed with each (new) member state, 
but there is no given timeframe within which the 
euro must be introduced. Looking at the list of the 
EU new member states, it is clear that so far the 
smaller EU member states have introduced the 
euro, while the bigger ones do not want to sacrifice 
their monetary policy.
Even though the decision to participate in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) is essentially 
political and depends on the fulfilment of the nomi-
nal convergence criteria set up in the Maastricht 
Treaty, public attitudes towards the common cur-
rency should not be ignored. Indeed, public opinion 
about the common currency in the euro area can 
be a very useful indicator for people from non-euro 
This paper is a result of scientific project The determi-
nants and challenges of competitiveness supported by the 
Faculty of Economics and Tourism “Dr. Mijo Mirković”, 
Juraj Dobrila University of Pula. Any opinions, findings, 
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily re-
flect the views of the Faculty of Economics and Tourism 
“Dr. Mijo Mirković” Pula.”
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area countries in the process of acceptance of and 
familiarisation with the euro. Also, positive atti-
tude towards the euro in euro-area members can 
help to avoid the fear of the common currency in 
the countries that consider the introduction of the 
euro. Here we would like to compare public opinion 
on the euro in countries that participate in the euro 
area with that of the rest of the EU new member 
states. In addition, we would like to find out if there 
is any relationship between the level of support 
for the euro and the level of development of a par-
ticular country. This is important because people’s 
concerns arise from the economic characteristics of 
their country and the current situation. 
In this analysis, secondary data from the Euroba-
rometer will be used and statistically elaborated. 
The research will include the period from 2004 to 
2017, covering the year of the biggest EU enlarge-
ment, and the crisis and post-crisis years.
The novelty of this research lies in the fact that up 
until now, public opinion on the introduction of the 
euro has not been sufficiently analysed and is usu-
ally focused on support to the EU or on the attitudes 
towards the euro in a particular country. Here we 
will systematically present the results for the EU 
new member states and in addition, we will employ 
econometric analysis to assess the importance of 
selected economic variables in terms of public sup-
port for the euro. 
The paper is structured into four chapters: the in-
troduction is followed by the literature review; the 
third chapter presents the research containing the 
data on public support for the euro, the economet-
ric analysis of key economic variables relevant to 
citizens’ attitudes towards the euro and their main 
fears and expectations concerning the introduction 
of the euro. The fourth chapter is the conclusion.
2. Literature review
Public opinion is the subject of many analyses, and 
if we focus on the EU, most often such research is 
oriented to the analysis of various issues to do with 
Euroscepticism. This term covers many determi-
nants such as political, institutional and economic 
issues (McLaren, 2002; Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2001; 
Hooghe, Mark, 2009). Public perception of the sin-
gle currency may be related to the level of the coun-
try’s development, individual wellbeing, the finan-
cial crisis, national identity, as well as a number of 
other factors. Low level of support for the euro, es-
pecially when viewed in terms of a country losing its 
currency, seen as a symbol of national sovereignty, 
and the fears and the negative aspects of euro intro-
duction, can be considered as soft Euroscepticism 
(Taggart, Szczerbiak, 2001). 
For this research, papers that deal with the inter-
connection between support for the euro and (mac-
ro) economic development are of key importance. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) have used GDP, un-
employment rates and inflation rates as these vari-
ables are considered as the essential elements of the 
economy. They showed that the domestic economic 
conditions have an impact on citizens’ attitudes to-
wards the EU. Gabel and Whitten (1997) added that 
citizens take their perception of both the national 
and their personal economic conditions into con-
sideration in creating theirs opinion about the EU.
Allam and Goerres (2011) focused their research 
on the relation between individual wellbeing and 
the level of support for the euro. They tested three 
perspectives: economic, political and historical-
ideational with individual-level and contextual data. 
They found that the success of economic transition, 
historical legacies of grave war experiences, and a 
personal identity not exclusively focused on the na-
tion and satisfaction with democracy have a positive 
influence on individual support for the euro. Inter-
estingly, economic self-interest is not the most im-
portant positive determinant. Palankai (2017) dis-
cusses the process of euro introduction in Central 
and Eastern European countries with the emphasis 
on nominal and real convergence criteria. He argues 
that the countries show diverging courses of action 
and policies, public support is also unclear, and the 
interests of transnational corporations (TNCs) and 
political elites contradict each other. There are many 
factors, cultural, legal, security and emotional ones 
that will play a key role in the adoption of the euro, 
but post-crisis recovery and a solution for migration 
crises are also important. Goněc (2015) focused his 
research on the different issues of eurscepticism/
eurorealism in the context of Czech and Slovak rela-
tionship. One of the analysed aspects deals with the 
monetary issue – where he pointed out that three 
Central European countries use the euro (Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Austria) while the other three use their 
own currencies (Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland). He also criticized the policy of devalua-
tion and its consequences in the Czech Republic. 
Ioanno, Jamet and Kleib (2015) emphasized that, 
beside the domestic economic performance, also 
circumstances (public debt; level of unemployment) 
in other EU members influence the public support 
for EU membership in a particular country.
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In the economic arena, we cannot ignore the impact 
of the financial crisis on the support for the euro. 
Kordić (2017) researched the correlation between 
public support for the euro in EU new member 
states (that have not yet introduced the euro) and 
the GDP growth rate in the period 2011-2015. She 
found different results, but in big countries, higher 
GDP growth is correlated with an increase in Euro-
scepticism, which means these countries recognize 
that monetary policy is an important instrument in 
driving their economies. Serricchio, Tsakatika and 
Quaglia (2013) researched the relations (influence) 
between global financial crisis and Euroscepticism 
and they found “that the economic crisis did not 
substantially bring economic factors back in as an 
important source of Euroscepticism, even though 
the most pronounced increase in Euroscepticism 
has taken place in the countries most affected by 
the crisis”. Roth, Jonung and Nowak-Lehmann 
(2016) researched public support for the euro in 12 
euro area members from 1990 to 2014. They found 
“that citizens’ support for the euro on average was 
marginally reduced during the first six years of the 
crisis, and that support has remained at high levels”. 
Braun and Tausendpfund (2016) found the impact 
of the Eurozone debt crisis to be more significant 
than the global crisis; and that individual perception 
of the crisis on EU support is stronger in euro area 
countries and in more developed EU member states. 
Economic factors during the crisis period play a 
crucial role in the explanation of support for the 
EU. Hobolt and Wratil (2015) also found that sup-
port for the euro has remained high within the euro 
area during the crisis years. This support is driven 
by utilitarian considerations, whereas identity con-
cerns are of lesser importance. Čábelková, Mitsche 
and Strielkowski (2015) warn that even though pub-
lic support for the EU in the Czech Republic prior to 
the EU accession was high, under new circumstanc-
es (the financial crisis, the euro area crisis, and the 
possible “Grexit”) support for the EU and the euro 
has been undermined. Genge (2014) (by examin-
ing the estimated class-conditional response prob-
abilities), confirmed that society can be divided into 
three groups – euro supporters, eurosceptics, and 
euro neutral citizens.
3. Research
In this paper, we have covered the period from 2004 
till 2017 because we want to show the development 
of public opinion and the changes that took place 
during the period of accession to the EU (2004 for 
the majority of EU new member states), the pre-
crisis period (2007), and the post-crisis years. The 
research includes the EU new member states that 
became EU members in 2004, 2007 and 2013. This 
was a very dynamic period because 7 out of 13 new 
members introduced the euro over the last 12 years. 
Because of this, the sample of countries that have 
not introduced the euro was changing. 
Public opinion in the EU is presented in the Stand-
ard Eurobarometer survey. In this paper, we are 
interested in the Eurobarometer’s research on pub-
lic opinion on the single currency. This kind of re-
search covered all EU member states before they 
had joined the euro area. After 1999, there are two 
kinds of research: research about public attitudes 
towards the euro that included EU member states 
that had not introduced the euro, and research 
about the euro and the functioning of the euro 
area for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
member states.
We will analyse the data from the Eurobarometer, 
covering the following statements/questions: Hav-
ing the euro is a good or a bad thing for your country 
(%) – for euro area members; Introduction of the 
euro would have positive or negative consequences - 
for non-euro area members; You are afraid of abus-
es and cheating on prices during the changeover; 
Adopting the euro will mean that (OUR COUNTRY) 
will lose control over its economic policy; Introduc-
ing the euro will increase inflation or help maintain 
price stability; When would you like the euro to be-
come your currency?; Is your country ready to intro-
duce the euro?
For better transparency and understanding, this 
section will be divided into three parts. In the first 
part, citizens’ attitudes towards the euro will be pre-
sented and discussed; in the second part, an econo-
metric analysis of the impact of economic factors 
on the level of euro support will be performed; and 
the third part of the research will outline the main 
advantages of the single currency, the fears and the 
expected negative consequences of the introduction 
of the euro.
3.1 People’s support for the euro in EU new 
member states
Table 1 is focused on support for the single currency 
and compares the expectations of introducing the 
euro in the EU member states that do not have the 
euro and public opinion on whether the euro is a 
good or bad thing for the euro area members. The 
data are mixed, but in the period before joining the 
euro area, the majority of countries expected the in-
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troduction of the euro to have a positive impact. The 
exceptions were just Latvia and Malta in 2004, while 
in 2017 the majority of people thought that having 
the euro is a good thing (except for Lithuania). In 
non-euro area members, the majority of people are 
in favour of introducing the euro, with the exception 
of Poland and the Czech Republic where the ma-
jority are not in favour of the euro. For Poland, the 
explanation may lie in the increasing popularity of 
far-right political parties and problems with Brus-
sels relating to the legal sphere. In addition, Poland 
is the only EU member that did not face a decline 
in GDP during the global financial crisis, so people 
support the government’s economic policy and they 
might be afraid that the euro will destroy or limit 
economic growth prospects. The contested issues 
between the EU and the Czech Republic include 
the quota system for the relocation of refugees, sug-
gested as a solution to the migrant crisis and widely 
opposed by the Czech public and politicians. This 
could be the reason for opposing the adoption of the 
euro (as a part of deeper integration).
Table 1 Support for the common currency from 2004 to 2017
Countries 2004 2007 2010 2013 2017
Introduction of the 
euro would have 
positive or negative 
consequences
Introduction of the 
euro would have 
positive or negative 
consequences
Introduction of the 
euro would have 
positive or negative 
consequences
Euro area members 
- Having the euro 
is a good or a bad 
thing for your 
country (%)
Euro area members 
- Having the euro 
is a good or a bad 
thing for your 
country (%)
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Good Bad Good Bad
Estonia 44 40 40 45 47 42 58 20 69 12
Cyprus 49 39 … … … 43 45 48 34
Latvia 38 41 34 51 34 52 40 54 53 25
Lithuania 45 41 35 53 41 49 35 55 36 48
Malta 35 44 … … … … 62 22 64 16
Slovenia 56 32 … … … … 55 35 63 25
Slovakia 49 38 … … … … 56 31 67 31
Non-Euro area members - for or against adopting the euro
For Against For Against For Against For Against For Against
Romania … … 67 18 56 34 67 28 64 30
Hungary 54 32 48 38 48 36 54 41 57 39
Croatia … … … … … … … … 52 43
Bulgaria … … 44 39 48 42 52 43 50 45
Poland 41 44 53 32 45 43 38 60 43 55
Czech 
Republic 45 42 46 40 38 57 14 80 29 70
Source: European Commission 2004, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2017a, 2017c2
As people’s fears about the euro can be connected 
with the level of development, Figure 1 shows the 
GDP per capita in EU new member states from the 
pre-crisis period (2006) to 2017. 
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Figure 1 GDP per capita in EU new member states 2006-2017 (EU28=100) in PPS
7	
	
 Source: Eurostat (2018), "GDP per capita in PPS", available at: 
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It is obvious that GDP per capita has increased in 
the majority of countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Croatia and Slove-
nia are facing a stagnation in GDP per capita (the 
same level in 2017 as it was in 2006), while Cyprus 
has a decreasing trend of GDP per capita. Some of 
the most developed new member states have in-
troduced the euro (Slovenia, Cyprus) but with the 
problem of achieving pre-crisis growth prospects, 
while so e (the Czech Republic) did not introduce 
the euro and reported growth in GDP per capita in 
the observ d period. Interestingly, Poland, with the 
highest average growth rate in the period 2006-2018 
of 4% annual , has very low support for the intro-
duction of the euro (just 43%), followed by Romania 
with the average growth rate of 3.8%, but with very 
high support for the euro of 64%. The Czech Repub-
lic had average growth rate of 2.83%, but the lowest 
support for the euro of just 29%. From these data, it 
is clear that countries that are non-euro area mem-
bers achieved higher growth rates, so it is open to 
question whether joining the common currency 
was a good thing for EU new member states. 
3.2 The ec nom c determinants of support for 
the euro in EU new member states
Here we will make an analysis to find out how the 
economic variables influence support for the euro. 
Thus far, no similar research has been carried out, 
which is w y we are including the va iables that c n 
be of significance to citizens’ attitudes:
1. GDP (Gross domestic product) per capita, 
in EUR and in PPS (EU=100) is the most 
used indicator of economic development. It 
can be expected that in a country with low 
level of GDP p.c. the support for the euro 
will be lower because people will have more 
fears about the negative consequences of 
euro introduction.
2. GDP growth rate (%, annual) is an indica-
tor of a country’s perspectives of develop-
ment. Higher growth rates are connected 
with more jobs, better salaries and standard 
of living. Therefore, it can have a positive 
impact on support for the euro, but it can 
also be an indicator that the country is do-
ing well without the euro, so there is no ex-
pected sign of influenc . 
3. Unemployment rate (%, annual) – is regard-
ed as one of the most important indicators 
for the state of an economy. If a country fac-
es higher levels of unemployment, people 
will not be satisfied with their situation and 
can expect a negative impact of the euro on 
domestic production. The introduction of 
the euro can seem as a step towards open-
ness of the economy (which will push in-
Ines Kersan-Škabić: Comparison of public opinion on the euro in the EU new member states
492 God. XXXII, BR. 2/2019. str. 487-502
tra-Eurozone trade), whereas the potential 
increase of imports can have a negative im-
pact on the uncompetitive domestic sector3. 
The increased intra-Eurozone trade can also 
be an opportunity for exporters to expand 
their business, which could result in new 
jobs. Regarding the level of development in 
EU new member states, the expectation is 
that the first influence will prevail.
4. Average earnings – people usually think 
about negative consequences of the euro if 
they have low wages. Therefore, if a country 
has higher wages, we expect to see higher 
support for the euro.4 We will apply the data 
about net earnings from Eurostat.
5. Inflation is one of the most important eco-
nomic variables and thus a key indicator of 
a stable macroeconomic environment in a 
particular country. If the prices are stable, 
we expect that people will be in favour of 
euro adoption.
6. Public debt - the level of government debt 
is important especially for the euro area, 
where sound public finances are regarded as 
key for maintaining the stability of the mon-
etary union. As the majority of Eurozone 
members increased their public debt during 
the financial crisis, and also some countries 
faced problems in servicing theirs debts, 
people in countries (EU new members) with 
high public debt before the Eurozone mem-
bership are afraid that the indebtedness will 
increase which can cause long-term con-
sequences5. It can negatively influence citi-
zens’ attitudes, i.e. support for the euro. 
7. Corruption (Corruption perception index, 
CPI, Transparency International) is impor-
tant for all countries, but especially for Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Croatia where the level 
of corruption is high and it is an important 
social and economic problem. The CPI mea-
sures the perceived levels of corruption in 
the public sector on a scale from 0 to 100, 
where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very 
clean. The expected impact of the CPI on 
support is negative (the more corruption, 
the less support for the euro). 
8. Intra-regional trade – measured as a share 
of intra-EU export in total export of EU new 
member states; it is expected that higher 
intra-EU trade will increase the support for 
the euro (because the majority of payments 
are in euro, and the introduction of the 
common currency will reduce the conver-
sion costs).
9. Dummy variable – crisis years, 2009 and 
years with the negative GDP growth rates – 
the value is 1, in other years the value is 0.6
Considering that the sample has a cross-sectional 
dimension, represented by countries (i = 1,…..,N) 
and a longitudinal dimension, represented by a time 
series (t = 1,….,T periods), the panel data method 
will be used (Hsiao, 2003). The sample comprises 
unbalanced panel data, i.e. there are some time pe-
riods missing from some units in the population of 
interest. 
We used random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) 
estimation methods, which allow us to deal with 
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. All the 
models are tested using the Hausman test to decide 
between RE and FE and standard errors that are ro-
bust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis that the 
difference in coefficients is not systematic, thus fa-
vouring random effect. 
The correlation matrix shows that, in general, multi-
collinearity is not a serious problem. Some variables 
(GDP per capita, earnings) are logged to interpret 
the coefficient as elasticities. All the models are cor-
rected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by 
using cluster robust standard errors.
The relationship between support for the euro and 
their determinants is as follows:
Euro support = α + β1*GDP per capitait + β2 *un-
employmentit + β3 *corruptionit + β4 *earningsit + 
β5*inflationit + β6*public debtit + β7*intra-EU tradeit 
+ dummy +εit,, 
i=1...N; t=1...T (1)
where the dependent variable is support for the 
euro (in %) and the independent variables are: GDP 
per capita, earnings, GDP growth rate, unemploy-
ment rate, corruption perception index, inflation, 
public debt, intra-EU trade (intra EU-export) and 
the dummy variable.
All the data are from the Eurostat database, except 
CPI which is from Transparency International. The 
analysis is done for the period from 2004 to 2017.
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Table 2 The determinants of public support for the euro in EU new member states – random effect 
method (positive attitudes – dependent variable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GDP p.c. 18.10203(6.91218)***
GDP growth rate 0.4615271(0.3029206)*







































R square 0.3911 0.3808 0.3751
Number of observations 129 129 129
Number of groups 13 13 13
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Wald test (p-value) 40.11 (0.000) 80.07 (0.000) 25.97 (0.001)
All the models include a constant variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***p statistically significant at 1%. **p 
statistically significant at 5%. *p statistically significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculations
We performed three models with a combination of 
independent variables discussed earlier. The inde-
pendent variables are the same in all three models 
with the exemption of GDP: in Model 1 we include 
the log of GDP per capita in current prices, in 
Model 2 we include the growth rate of GDP and in 
Model 3 we include the index of GDP per capita in 
relation to the EU average (GDP EU28=100). 
The findings are: GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, 
index of GDP per capita (EU28=100) and net earn-
ings have a positive and significant impact on pub-
lic support for the euro, while the unemployment 
rate and level of corruption have a negative impact. 
Among all these variables, only GDP per capita has 
a very high (strong) influence, while GDP growth 
rates and index of GDP have a significant, but weak 
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influence. The dummy variable for the crisis period, 
the level of public debt, the inflation and the share 
of intra-EU export are not significant variables. 
This can be explained with the fact that people usu-
ally don’t think about the level of public debt when 
thinking about the euro, and on the other hand, 
the prices are quite stable (there were low inflation 
rates, even the prices decreased in some observed 
years). Interestingly, the level of earnings (net) is 
significant and has a positive impact on public sup-
port for the euro. It can be supported by the fact 
that people with higher wages have less fear about 
the possible negative consequences of the euro.
3.3 The expected benefits and fears of euro intro-
duction
Usually people were afraid of an increase in prices 
as a result of cheating in converting prices from 
the national currency to the euro. In 2004, in all 
EU new member states (currently euro area mem-
bers) the vast majority of people (over 60%) were 
afraid of that kind of cheating. Slovenia is the only 
country where people were not so sceptical. In Lat-
via and Lithuania, countries that have adopted the 
euro most recently, in 2013 over 70% of people were 
afraid of this kind of cheating.
Table 3a Are you afraid of abuses and cheating on prices during the changeover? Euro area members
Countries
2004 2007 2010 2013
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Estonia 70 21 65 26 … … … …
Cyprus 72 24 78 18 … … … …
Latvia 68 24 68 27 72 23 81 18
Lithuania 67 26 77 20 77 21 75 21
Malta 72 23 76 20 … … … …
Slovenia 34 64 … … … … … …
Slovakia 64 24 72 23 … … … …
Source: European Commission 2004, 2007, 2010b, 2013b, 2017c
Table 3b Are you afraid of abuses and cheating on prices during the changeover? Non-euro area  
members
2004 2007 2010 2013 2017
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Romania … … 51 41 61 35 66 30 66 30
Hungary 49 46 75 21 74 20 66 31 67 30
Croatia … … … … … … 75* 23* 82 15
Bulgaria … … 82 14 74 22 77 20 81 17
Poland 83 14 74 21 82 14 78 21 74 24
Czech Republic 63 27 67 29 74 22 74 24 73 24
Source: European Commission 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2017a
From the rest of the EU, Croatian citizens also ex-
pressed a high level of concern about cheating on 
prices (82%), which is the highest percentage of 
all other EU members where people are sceptical 
about cheating.
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Table 4 Adopting the euro will mean that (OUR COUNTRY) will lose control over its economic policy
Countries
2004 2007 2010 2013 2017
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Estonia 43 38 37 44 … … … … … …
Cyprus 41 46 38 51 … … … … … …
Latvia 45 27 48 34 55 36 63 34 … …
Lithuania 36 41 39 42 40 48 43 48 … …
Malta 31 45 29 57 … … … … … …
Slovenia 28 56 … … … … … … … …
Slovakia 32 39 30 56 … … … … … …
Non-euro area members 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Romania … … 18 62 27 55 45 46 47 43
Hungary 23 67 28 61 28 61 28 61 36 58
Croatia … … … … … … 47* 48* 52 40
Bulgaria … … 33 40 30 50 43 48 51 40
Poland 36 48 28 58 36 49 44 51 42 52
Czech Republic 30 50 38 47 50 45 54 42 50 45
*Data refers to 2014. 
Source: European Commission 2004, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2017a, 2017c
In 2004, the citizens of EU new member states had 
different attitudes about the influence the euro 
would have on losing control over national eco-
nomic policy. The citizens of Estonia and Latvia 
thought this would happen, while the citizens of 
other countries were not afraid of this happening. 
In 2017, people in Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria and 
the Czech Republic thought that introducing the 
euro implies losing control over national economic 
policy. Here it is important to note that it is debat-
able how familiar people are with the economic 
policies of their countries, whether they differenti-
ate monetary from fiscal policy, and which policy(-
ies) they believe the country would lose. However, 
to some extent, people are right - countries will lose 
control over their monetary policies, and greater 
pressure to promote competitiveness, investments 
and growth will be placed on the fiscal policy.
Table 5 When would you like the euro to become your currency?
Countries 2004 2010 2013 2017
Non-euro area members 
As soon as 
possible
As late as 
possible
As soon as 
possible
As late as 
possible
As soon as 
possible
As late as 
possible
As soon as 
possible
As late as 
possible
Romania … … 39 22 36 29 37 32
Hungary 32 21 30 29 19 36 22 35
Croatia … … … … 18 39 20 41
Bulgaria … … 19 23 14 34 17 35
Poland 17 45 12 47 10 54 14 52
Czech 
Republic 16 42 13 47 5 65 9 67
Source: European Commission 2004, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2017a, 2017c
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Countries that have not introduced the euro express 
the opinion that the euro should be introduced as 
late as possible. Citizens in Poland and the Czech 
Republic in particular are in favour of the later 
adoption of the euro. The opposite is true only in 
Romania where people would like to introduce the 
euro as soon as possible. There is also a substantial 
number of people that are not in favour of either 
of these options, who think the euro should be in-
troduced after a certain time. Some Eurobarometer 
surveys also indicate this, but there is no continuity 
in measuring this sub-group so it was not possible 
to show the data in the table.
Figure 2 shows that about 20% of people think 
their country is ready for the euro while about 77% 
think their country is not ready. In the last three 
years, there haven’t been big changes in public 
opinion. It can be noted that Hungary has an in-
creasing number of citizens who think that Hun-
gary is ready for the euro (17% in 2015 and 22% in 
2017), and the same goes for the Czech Republic 
(from 15% to 19% in favour of the euro) and Croa-
tia (from 20% to 23%). Nevertheless, the majority 
of people think that their countries are not ready 
to adopt the euro.
Figure 2 Is your country ready to introduce the euro? (Answer: Yes)
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Regarding the last question, it is important to ex-
plore how far the national governments take into 
consideration public opinion on the readiness for 
the euro. For example, in Croatia, the government 
has adopted a new strategy that targets switching to 
the single currency within five to seven years (Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Croatia and CNB, 2018). 
Nevertheless, it is also necessary to compare public 
attitudes with the formal criteria for introducing the 
euro. The European Commission and the European 
Central Bank biannually publish a Convergence Re-
port that includes all non-euro area members and 
assesses whether the countries fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria (European Commission, 2018).7
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Table 6 Fulfilment of criteria for introducing the euro in 2018
Fiscal discipline in 2017











Compatible with the 
compliance duty un-
der Article 131 TFEU







Bulgaria Not fully compatible 1.4% 0.9% 25.4% No 1.4%
Czech Republic Not fully compatible 2.2% 1.6% 35% No 1.3%
Croatia Fully compatible 1.3% 0.8% 78% No 2.6%
Hungary Not fully compatible 2.2% -2% 73.6% No 2.7%
Poland Not fully compatible 1.4% -2.3% 50.6% No 3.3%
Romania Not fully compatible 1.9% -2.9% 35% No 4.1%
ERM- Exchange rate mechanism 
Source: European Commission (2018), “Convergence Report 2018. European Economy”, Institutional paper No. 078,  
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip078_en.pdf (Accessed on: July 4, 2018) 8
From Table 6 we can see that none of the non-euro 
area members fulfils all of the nominal convergence 
criteria9. None participated in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM II) that the national currency 
should participate in for at least two years before it 
can qualify to adopt the euro. ERM II implies that 
a central exchange rate between the euro and the 
country’s currency is agreed. The currency is then 
allowed to fluctuate by up to 15% above or below 
this central rate. Countries apply different exchange 
rate systems: from currency board in Bulgaria to 
floating exchange rate (with central bank interven-
tions) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia and 
Poland. The criterion of price stability is fulfilled in 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Poland. The fiscal discipline 
(public finance) criterion is met in all countries. The 
long-term interest rates criterion is fulfilled in Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Hungary. 
Considering the fact that the Treaty does not spec-
ify a particular timeframe for joining the euro area, 
it leaves it to Member States to develop their own 
strategies for meeting the conditions for euro adop-
tion. The global financial crisis and the crisis of the 
euro area with the particular issues facing southern 
EU member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal, etc.) 
raises questions about the benefits and limitations 
of common monetary policy in crisis years and also 
it deepens the European core-and-periphery di-
vide. In that period, the majority of non-euro area 
members did not consider euro introduction; they 
wanted to see the post-crisis recovery of the men-
tioned countries as well as the stability and success 
of the Economic and Monetary Union. At present in 
Croatia, the strategy for adopting the euro does not 
include a fixed target date (between five and seven 
years) (Government of the Republic of Croatia and 
CNB, 201810). The other countries have adopted a 
strategy for euro introduction but with no concrete 
steps towards its realization, i.e. the Czech Republic 
(Riedel, 2015). Even though some target dates have 
been established, they are subject to many changes, 
i.e. Romania first set the target for euro adoption 
in 2013-2014, but it did not happen; Hungary ini-
tially planned to introduce the euro in 2008 or 2009, 
while now no official target date has been set. Bul-
garia sent a letter to the Eurogroup in July 2018 and 
expressed its desire to participate in ERM II and 
Croatia did the same in July 2019. Romania set 2024 
as the target date for euro introduction. Poland is 
the farthest from the introduction of the euro due 
to the fact that the 2015 Polish parliamentary elec-
tion was won by the eurosceptic Law and Justice 
Party, which opposes the adoption of the euro.
4. Conclusion
The EU is facing a huge debate about its future mod-
el of functioning where participation in the euro 
Ines Kersan-Škabić: Comparison of public opinion on the euro in the EU new member states
498 God. XXXII, BR. 2/2019. str. 487-502
area is one of the issues and represents a model for 
deepening the integration. Although the establish-
ment of the Economic and Monetary Union was a 
great success in the EU integration process, it faced 
various limitations and negative consequences dur-
ing the crisis years in some EU member states. Even 
though the process of entering the EMU is linked to 
the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and it is 
a political decision, the attitudes of people towards 
the euro, its consequences, positive aspects and 
risks should not be neglected. Because of this, in 
this paper we analysed public support for the euro 
in EU new member states, for the seven countries 
that have already joined the EMU, and for the other 
non-euro area members. Their citizens’ opinions 
are considered alongside with the fulfilment of the 
convergence criteria and with the national target 
dates for the introduction of the euro.
Despite the global financial crisis and the euro area 
crisis, support for the euro is high in EMU mem-
bers where the majority of citizens thought the 
introduction of the euro is a good thing for their 
countries. The only exception is Lithuania. In non-
euro area members the majority of people are in fa-
vour of the introduction of the euro with only two 
exceptions: Poland and the Czech Republic.
The main economic determinants that influence 
public support for the euro in EU new member 
states are GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, GDP 
per capita (EU=100) and net earnings, which have 
a positive impact, and unemployment rates and 
corruption, which have a negative influence on 
people’s attitudes, which is in accordance with our 
expectations. From the chosen economic variables 
it is obvious that only some of them are relevant 
for the explanation of public support for the euro, 
which is the main limitation of this research. That 
provides scope for broadening the research with 
the inclusion of other variables that go beyond the 
economic sphere.
People were afraid of abuses and cheating during the 
changeover; this is common to both EMU members 
and non-EMU members. The majority of people ex-
pect the introduction of the euro will cause price in-
creases and they tend to think that their country will 
lose control over its economic policy. Here it is inter-
esting to connect the Eurobarometer results with the 
results from econometric analysis – where the infla-
tion rate is not significant for the level of support for 
the euro, but when people are asked to indicate the 
most important sources of fears regarding the euro, 
they put “increase of prices” as the most important 
one. It is interesting that even though non-euro area 
countries are in favour of euro introduction, people 
think this should happen as late as possible and over 
70% of people think their country is not ready to in-
troduce the euro.
The majority of non-euro area governments from 
Central and Eastern Europe are in line with public 
opinion and want to delay the introduction of the 
euro for as long as possible. Bulgaria and Croatia 
want to join the ERM II. Also, the Croatian govern-
ment passed a euro adoption strategy with no target 
date, however, it is putting a lot of effort into creat-
ing a positive climate for the adoption of the euro.
Government policy should take public opinion 
into consideration, including the fears people have 
about the euro, and present a clear explanation of 
the benefits and costs of taking part in the mon-
etary union. 
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Ines Kersan-Škabić
Usporedba javnog mnijenja o euru u novim  
zemljama članicama Europske unije 
Sažetak
Ovaj rad sustavno prikazuje stavove građana o euru, posljedicama uvođenja eura, pozitivnim gledištima, ali 
i strahovima ljudi povezanih uz uvođenje eura. Istraživanje je usmjereno i utvrđivanju ekonomskih varijabli 
potpore euru. Ekonometrijska analiza dokazuje da razina ekonomskog razvoja i visina plaća pozitivno utje-
ču na potporu euru, dok stope nezaposlenosti i razina korupcije imaju negativan utjecaj. Građani iskazuju 
pozitivan stav prema euru; većina ispitanika u zemljama izvan europodručja su za uvođenje eura (ali što je 
kasnije moguće); većina se također boji gubitka kontrole nad nacionalnom ekonomskom politikom; oče-
kuju nepravilnosti („varanje“) u izražavanju cijena u eurima i očekuju porast inflacije nakon uvođenja eura. 
Zemlje koje su, po stavovima građana, najudaljenije od uvođenja eura su Poljska i Češka, dok su Republika 
Hrvatska i Bugarska započele proces uvođenja eura.
Ključne riječi: europodručje, nove zemlje članice, euro, javno mnijenje
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Appendix
Descriptive statistics of variables
. pwcorr
             |     var1     year suppor~o gdpeu100 gdppce~s gdpgro~e unempl~e
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
        var1 |   1.0000 
        year |   0.0000   1.0000 
supporttoe~o |   0.3897   0.1093   1.0000 
    gdpeu100 |   0.1207   0.2429   0.1125   1.0000 
gdppceurcu~s |   0.0616   0.3711   0.1795   0.9415   1.0000 
gdpgrowthr~e |   0.1048  -0.1633   0.0238  -0.0833  -0.1128   1.0000 
unemployme~e |  -0.0754  -0.0247  -0.1779  -0.3427  -0.2766  -0.2446   1.0000 
netannuals~r |   0.1761   0.3148   0.2154   0.8347   0.9094  -0.1072  -0.2721 
corruption~x |   0.1332   0.2881   0.0807   0.6953   0.6897  -0.1098  -0.2643 
 dummycrisis |  -0.0000  -0.1032   0.1230  -0.0118  -0.0365  -0.6256   0.0198 
   inflation |   0.0179  -0.5493   0.0449  -0.3541  -0.3556   0.1537  -0.1656 
  publicdebt |  -0.0004   0.3422   0.0183   0.3884   0.4596  -0.2216   0.1912 
    loggdppc |   0.1110   0.4085   0.1615   0.9440   0.9608  -0.1579  -0.2390 
  logearning |   0.2499   0.3980   0.2093   0.8935   0.9326  -0.1917  -0.1840 
     _est_fe |   0.2650  -0.1995   0.0472  -0.0928  -0.2181  -0.0135   0.0662 
     _est_re |   0.2650  -0.1995   0.0472  -0.0928  -0.2181  -0.0135   0.0662 
intraeutrade |   0.2774  -0.1230   0.0050  -0.0416  -0.1768   0.0637  -0.0442 
 euroisation |  -0.5333  -0.0572   0.1904  -0.5013  -0.3721  -0.1382   0.4784 
             | netann~r corrup~x dummyc~s inflat~n public~t loggdppc logear~g
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
netannuals~r |   1.0000 
corruption~x |   0.5643   1.0000 
 dummycrisis |  -0.0062  -0.0257   1.0000 
   inflation |  -0.3465  -0.2733  -0.0468   1.0000 
  publicdebt |   0.4525   0.1732  -0.0527  -0.4085   1.0000 
    loggdppc |   0.8411   0.7255  -0.0282  -0.4047   0.4605   1.0000 
  logearning |   0.9380   0.6637   0.0106  -0.4266   0.4695   0.9469   1.0000 
     _est_fe |   0.1062  -0.0135   0.0369   0.0548  -0.2132  -0.1252   0.2332 
     _est_re |   0.1062  -0.0135   0.0369   0.0548  -0.2132  -0.1252   0.2332 
intraeutrade |  -0.2012  -0.1161   0.0117   0.0657  -0.2201  -0.1064  -0.0446 
 euroisation |  -0.4714  -0.4869   0.0227   0.0535  -0.0481  -0.3406  -0.5373 
             |  _est_fe  _est_re intrae~e    euroisation
-------------+------------------------------------
     _est_fe |   1.0000 
     _est_re |   1.0000   1.0000 
intraeutrade |   0.2552   0.2552   1.0000 
 euroisation |  -0.4892  -0.4892  -0.8950   1.0000 
Hausman test
hausman fe re
                 ---- Coefficients ----
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E.
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
 dummycrisis |    4.033032      3.97201        .0610216               .
  publicdebt |    -.140064    -.1221202       -.0179438        .0489692
    loggdppc |    21.14679     17.24146        3.905328        2.704661
   inflation |   -.1351523     -.098098       -.0370543        .0626036
unemployme~e |   -.8121217    -.7417433       -.0703784        .1301855
corruption~x |   -.8415045    -.7357852       -.1057193        .0807787
  logearning |    6.700727     6.405271        .2954558        1.643711
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        7.96
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3365
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
